ACCC weighs changes to superfast broadband access rules

ACCC weighs changes to superfast broadband access rules

Following concerns from access seekers regarding Uniti Group’s wholesale pricing, the ACCC is considering whether to expand its regulation of non-NBN providers

The ACCC is inviting views on changing wholesale access rules for superfast broadband networks

On 26 February 2025, the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) published a discussion paper on the superfast broadband access service (SBAS) access determination inquiry, which began on 15 January 2025. The SBAS is the wholesale service for superfast (i.e. 25Mbps+) non-National Broadband Network (NBN) fixed-line networks, which is used by operators to supply broadband to consumers at the retail level. The access determination provides a “fall back” set of terms and conditions that access seekers can rely on if they fail to reach a commercial agreement for use of a provider’s broadband network. The ACCC is seeking stakeholder opinion until 28 March on whether to vary the current SBAS access determination to include additional regulated access terms. These terms would be focused on the locations and characteristics of the points of interconnection for operators to access an SBAS.

The inquiry follows ACCC action against Uniti Group over its compliance with the existing SBAS access determination

The current SBAS access determination came into force on 1 September 2024 and regulates connection, transfer, access provider transparency, interconnection charges and end user appointment fees for SBAS networks. The determination also provides that regulated access prices are benchmarked against wholesale prices for access to the NBN as a comparative measure. However, soon after coming into force, industry raised concerns to the ACCC about the October 2024 product and price offerings of Uniti Group – one of the two largest suppliers of the SBAS. As Uniti Group’s pricing had already taken effect, the ACCC considered it necessary to urgently address these issues and the way that the operator was complying with its standard access obligations, issuing a binding rules of conduct (BROC) in December 2024. According to the ACCC, the BROC was intended as a temporary remedy, establishing interim terms of access until new terms are determined by its ongoing public inquiry.

Interconnection arrangements are the most important access terms according to the ACCC

In the discussion paper, the ACCC considers interconnection arrangements between access providers and seekers as key because they determine the location from which operators must interconnect to acquire a fixed-line broadband service. The number and location of these interconnections are also important because these affect the up-front and ongoing costs of access that operators pay. Operators criticised the ACCC’s previous SBAS access determination for how per-service access costs reduced as operators spread these across larger customer bases, arguing that these created a barrier to entry or expansion for smaller operators or those using networks with less addressable customers. As well as this, the number and location of the points of interconnection needed to service customers will have an impact on the access providers’ costs of supplying wholesale services. In particular, if an access agreement uses more centralised interconnection points than widely distributed ones, this will incur incremental backhaul costs to transfer network traffic for providers. Currently though, the ACCC’s preliminary view is that by benchmarking SBAS access prices to NBN access prices, efficient providers will be able to recover their costs of network access.

The ACCC’s discussion paper sets out a number of key questions for stakeholders to consider

The ACCC notes that changes to the underlying network architecture or points of interconnection could potentially disrupt competition and network services, As such, it is asking stakeholders to provide their views on whether, and if so how, to ensure operators have the flexibility to make network changes over time without risking competition or network efficiency. The discussion paper also sets out four main lines of questioning for stakeholders to respond to:

  1. Additional regulated terms: Should additional regulated access terms focused on the points of interconnect be added to the existing SBAS access determination and if so, how should these be implemented?

  2. Protections for access seekers: Should additional safeguarding measures against the imposition of unreasonable access terms be included in the SBAS access determination and if so, how should these be implemented?

  3. Compliance with regulated terms: Should the mandatory compliance requirements of the SBAS access determination be specific to certain providers or limited to some through established criteria?

  4. Further issues: Are there any further relevant issues that should be considered when deciding on potential additional regulated access terms in the SBAS access determination?

The ACCC is clearly most concerned about potential competition and network efficiency issues that may arise from network changes, as well as the locations and characteristics of the points of interconnection. The regulator also sets out the potential for varied access terms depending on the providers and other contextual criteria.